other facts that one would like such models to explain and therefore many further fences for these models to fall at, at least we could have made some progress, in a Popperian way (Popper, 1934) , in removing some model versions from contention in so far as they fail over in ‡ation persistence.
It turns out that UK data is an answer to this implicit prayer. Whereas it has proved hard to reach agreement on what monetary regimes were in place in the US and indeed whether there was ever any change at all (except brie ‡y at the start of the 1980s with the experiment in the control of bank reserves), for the UK there have been several well-documented changes in monetary regime. Furthermore it is possible, as we will show, to back up the massive documentary evidence econometrically.
Thus in this paper we focus on the phenomenon of in ‡ation persistence in the UK over the post-war period; our aim is to use it to test DSGE models with di¤ering degrees of nominal rigidity. We begin with the facts of regime change, the sine qua non of our methods here. We review the shifts between …xed and ‡oating exchange rates and within the latter between di¤erent sorts of monetary and other methods of in ‡ation control. We test our documented split of regimes using a method recently suggested by Qu and Perron (2007) and we …nd reasonable support for our proposed splits. We are then able to proceed to the next stage which is to estimate the facts of in ‡ation persistence in each episode; we proceed as simply as possible, estimating a parsimonious univariate ARMA for each. As one would expect in such subsamples the in ‡ation process is clearly stationary (a main reason for nonstationarity is after all regime shift); furthermore we know from the DSGE models we set up that the …nal form of the in ‡ation process will be an ARMA of …nite order. We then use the parameters of this ARMA and its implied impulse response function to assess the degree of persistence.
We then turn to the question of how much nominal stickiness is needed to account for the persistence revealed in each episode. We take a standard DSGE model of the open economy with exogenous capital and inject into it di¤erent degrees of nominal rigidity; we follow the widely-used procedure of taking a 'stripped down'model, where the Euler equations are converted into a forward-looking IS curve, and the remainder of the model consists of the equations for the monetary or other in ‡ation-control regime in place together with the Phillips Curve (and its varying degree of nominal rigidity). We test our di¤erent model versions by asking whether each in turn could have generated the patterns of persistence we …nd in the actual data. To do this we generate the sampling variability within the model under each regime by the method of bootstrapping the model's estimated residuals; this permits us to …nd the statistical distribution of the ARM A parameters in the in ‡ation regression under the null hypothesis of each model and thus to reject or accept each model. We can also compare the impulse response functions we …nd in the data with the 95% bounds generated by each model; this test essentially replicates the other one in a more transparent way.
To anticipate our conclusions, …rst we do not …nd that in ‡ation persistence is a stylised constant; it appears largely to disappear at various points in the post-war UK, notably most recently; this favours the view that this is indeed connected to several changes in monetary regime, with di¤erent regimes exhibiting very di¤erent degrees of persistence. Second, we …nd that while high in ‡ation stickiness can account best for some regimes and low stickiness best for others, the best overall model across all regimes is one with minimum stickiness.
In section 2 therefore we estimate ARM A models for UK data in the various post-war regimes we identify. In section 3 we set out our various models for each monetary regime, calibrate and …t them to the data, to …nd the implied model errors later to be used in bootstrapping. In section 4 we carry out the bootstrap tests of the models. Section 5 concludes.
Estimating UK in ‡ation persistence under changing regimes
Persistence de…nes the extent to which the e¤ect of a shock persists both in terms of size and length of time; for in ‡ation this e¤ect should be positive, as negative persistence is typically thought of as extreme non-persistence. For a univariate time-series there is no unambiguous scalar measure -see Pivetta and Reis (2007) , Phillips (1991) , Andrews (1993) , Andrews and Chen (2004) , Marques (1994) , Murray and Papell (2002) , Rossi (2001) , Hamilton (1994) . Matters can be simpli…ed somewhat by assuming an AR process in which case frequently used measures include the sum of the coe¢ cients, the largest root, or the half life (the number of periods for which in ‡ation remains above 0.5 for a unit shock). For an ARMA as assumed here the …rst two are inappropriate because they ignore the MA coe¢ cients. As we will see below, little hinges on the precise measure used since the impulse response functions (IRFs) estimated are highly transparent and therefore do not require summarising. For completeness we report as summary measures both the half-life and the nearest AR(1) approximation to the IRF.
Over the past decade we have observed substantial shifts in the monetary policy of a number of countries, particularly the widespread adoption of explicit in ‡ation targets. There is a growing body of research supporting the view that the monetary regime in place has an impact on the persistence properties of in ‡ation -see Brainard and Perry (2000) , Taylor (2000) and Kim, Nelson and Piger (2001) , Ravenna (2000) , Benati (2002) and Levin & Piger (2003) .
For the UK in particular, several authors have examined the many shifts in monetary regimes that have occurred -including Nelson (2001), Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Nelson (2007) . For the period as a whole, there have been large swings both in in ‡ation and economic growth. In ‡ation was continuously in double digits during most of the 1970s, and returned there in the early 1980s and 1990s. However, like the US from the mid-1980s, the UK experienced a 'great moderation'from 1992.
Plainly, the question of regime breaks is of the utmost importance for our subsequent analysis. Our regime identi…cation is supported by a wealth of narrative evidence (Annex B). Thus the break-up of Bretton Woods (our …rst regime) and the UK's shift into ‡oating in 1972 is a matter of historical record. There followed what we call the 'incomes policy regime', marked by a monetary and …scal policy that responded almost exclusively to the levels of output and unemployment; in ‡ation was controlled through episodes of wage/price controls and we model the in ‡ation process directly as a product of these 1 . This period ends in 1979 with the election of a Conservative government committed to monetary targeting. It was clearly not a sustainable regime in the normal sense since it lacked any monetary anchoring of in ‡ation. Since it is not a monetary regime, our models shed no light on it and we will therefore disregard it in our tests of them.
The introduction of monetary targeting in 1979 followed political controversy over the control of in ‡ation. Though the Labour government of James Callaghan had introduced monetary targets in 1976, they were implemented with the help of direct controls on bank deposits and accompanied by wage/price controls because of a lack of faith in the monetary framework among leading Labour ministers. The Conservatives by contrast opposed the use of wage/price controls because they distorted market forces and were in their view ine¤ective in the long-term control of in ‡ation. Hence the old regime relied on those controls whereas the new regime from 1979 relied exclusively on monetary policy.
The period of 'exchange rate targeting'from 1986 until the 1992 exit from the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System (the ERM) is also well documented. During this period there was disagreement between ministers on how monetary policy should be conducted but informally the Treasury installed an exchange rate target to guide its setting of interest rates -a prodecure known as 'shadowing the Deutschemark'. After the fall of Margaret Thatcher from o¢ ce in late 1990, the pound formally entered the ERM.
In September 1992 the pound left the ERM under the speculative attack of 'Black Wednesday'. Over the next few months the Treasury and the Bank of England decided to institute the -at that stage relatively new -monetary framework of in ‡ation targeting that had been pioneered by New Zealand. As part of this framework the Bank was made publicly co-responsible for the setting of interest rates and was to publish a regular In ‡ation Report. Later, when Labour came to power in 1997, the Bank was given sole responsibility for setting interest rates but the framework was otherwise largely unchanged. Thus we treat the whole period from 1992 as a single in ‡ation targeting regime.
Though the narrative evidence is fairly clear-cut, it could be questioned whether there was statistical evidence from the macro time-series supporting the existence of these regime breaks. For this purpose we look at the evidence from the three endogenous macro variables identi…ed in our models: output, in ‡ation and the short-term interest rate. We estimate a VAR in the stationarised values of each viz, log(output), in ‡ation and (interest rate). Using the method of Qu and Perron (2007), we split the sample into three overlapping 20-year sub-samples that each contain two breaks according to our narrative analysis; this split was for computational reasons as running the whole sample in one proved to be too computationally burdensome for the programme to solve. The sub-samples were 1965-85; 1975-95 and 1985-2003 . We looked for breaks in both parameters and covariance matrices, with no limit on the number of breaks to be identi…ed. The results are reported in Table 1 which shows when each regime ends and the 95% con…dence interval.
These tests generally con…rm the existence of the assumed breaks and place them reasonably close to the assumed break date. 2 They place the end of regimes rather later than we have assumed, in all cases. 1 It is therefore determinate, even if plainly wage/price controls are unsustainable and duly ended in 1979. Clarida et al (2000) suggest for the US that before 1979 a highly accommodative Taylor Rule operated, but such a rule gives an indeterminate solution for in ‡ation. We leave the interesting issue of how exactly to model this regime in terms of monetary (and also …scal) policy to later work. Here we e¤ectively omit this regime in our comparison of models. 2 Benati (2004) On this particular point we decided to allow the narrative evidence to stretch the Exchange Rate targeting sample to include the previous couple of years where there is known to have been 'shadowing'of the ERM, with an expressed target for the sterling-deutschemark rate. In defence of this procedure we would say that when policy regimes change there may well be a lag before agents'behaviour changes; this lag will be the longer when the regime change is not clearly communicated or its e¤ects are not clearly understood. A reasonable case can be made that both with the introduction of both Exchange Rate Targeting and In ‡ation Targeting this was the case. With the …rst the switch in policy was deliberately kept unannounced by the Treasury to conceal it from other parts of government (notably 10 Downing Street) which remained attached to Monetary Targeting. With In ‡ation Targeting the issue was more the sheer unfamiliarity of the regime; only New Zealand had previously adopted it. However we do look at the alternative break points suggested by the Qu-Perron tests (Annex C 3 ) as part of our robustness checks; we …nd that though particular results change they do not a¤ect our conclusions. Table 2 shows the mean and standard deviation of in ‡ation for the di¤erent regimes (annualised quarterly rates of change, in fractions per annum). The high water mark of in ‡ation both in mean and variance was the Incomes Policy period of the 1970s. This followed the relatively tranquil period of Bretton Woods; and it was in turn followed by the period of Monetary Targeting when in ‡ation was brought down dramatically. During the Exchange Rate Targeting regime it fell further; this was a period containing a severe recession also. At its end there again followed a period of relative tranquility, under the new In ‡ation Targeting regime.
Regime
The best-…tting ARMA equation for each regime was chosen under the criterion of parsimony. All regressions also contained a constant and three seasonal dummies. (Notice that Boero et al., 2007, found no evidence of moving variance within similar sub-periods to ours.) Starting with ARMA(1,0) we …rst raised the order of MA by one and then that of the AR by one, and so on upwards, each time doing an Ftest to test (at 99%) whether the more parsimonious model was a valid restriction. The order was raised only if we reject the null hypothesis of a valid restriction. Parsimony increases the power of our tests across DSGE models, possibly at the expense of bias in the estimates of the IRF shape. A further issue that could be raised is our decision to use the quarterly rather than the year-on-year change in prices to to exchange rate targeting. 3 The annexes can be found at http://www.cf.ac.uk/carbs/faculty/minfordp/ model the in ‡ation time-series; sampling error (Shoemaker, 2006) could produce more persistence than could be accounted for by the MA structure in the annual than in the quarterly rate. To check on these issues, we repeated our procedures using time-series forms chosen by Boero et al. (2009) for both annual and quarterly changes -Annex C, last section. We found no evidence in UK data of the Shoemaker e¤ect; and we also found that our results were robust to Boero et al's quarterly speci…cation -discussed further below. The F tests can be seen in Table 3 4 , the resulting parameters in Table 4 : and the IRFs in Figure 1 . In all cases the ARMA was of maximum order two, while in three cases we selected AR(1). Below the IRFs in Figure 1 we show -where the ARMA order is higher than AR(1) -the closest AR(1) approximation (…tted by OLS to the IRF) and also a table of the half-life. Summarising these results, we …nd very low persistence under Bretton Woods and again under Money Targeting 5 and In ‡ation Targeting, but the two other regimes exhibit high persistence. We now turn to the speci…cation and calibration of the New Keynesian and New Classical models within each regime we have identi…ed. 4 For the MT regime the ARMA(1,1), with AIC of 3:099847 and R 2 of 0:596308, outperformed the ARMA(2,0), with AIC of 2:777950 and R 2 of 0:443009. We therefore chose it. Nevertheless we also examined later the ARMA(2,0) case because it suggested much greater persistence for this regime. 3 Comparing Models and Data using the Bootstrap
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The Structural Model -with New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve
We now set up simple models with varying in ‡ation stickiness, derived from micro-foundations. In doing this we follow the well-known methods used for example by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) and McCallum and Nelson (1999, 2000 ) -see Annex A for details in our case. Here we give a verbal description of what we have done, with a summary of the resulting models. For simplicity we will distinguish between sticky-price 'New Keynesian' models, based on Calvo contracts and ‡exible-price 'New Classical'models with a simple one-quarter information lag. The root model is identical between New Keynesian and New Classical, apart from the Phillips Curve and the information assumptions (there is an information lag in the New Classical model only; this is needed to give monetary policy an e¤ect on output within a ‡exible price economy). Within the New Keynesian model we will distinguish in turn between three degrees of in ‡ation stickiness: high (with a strong backward-looking element), medium (where backward and forward-looking elements are of similar size) and low (where the forward-looking element is dominant). All these models assume the high price rigidity of Calvo contracts but they di¤er in terms of the stickiness of in ‡ation because of the backward-looking indexation component. Only the New Classical model embodies complete price ‡exibility, with just an information lag to give an element of temporary rigidity.
In all the models the …rst equation is the IS curve of the expectational variety that includes E t y t+1 as in Kerr and King (1996) , McCallum and Nelson (1997, 1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) . This optimising IS function can be regarded as a transformation of the structural consumption Euler equation, with the market-clearing condition for output substituted into it; the error term captures stochastic movements in government spending, exports etc. In the case of the two regimes treated here as having a …xed exchange rate -Bretton Woods and Exchange Rate Targeting -we have an additional expenditure switching e¤ect (between the home and foreign goods) in the IS curve.
The second equation in the models is the New Keynesian or New Classical Phillips curve. The former is derived from Calvo contract price-setting with the addition of backward-looking indexation. The latter is the equation of a clearing labour market equating the marginal product of labour with the Euler equation for labour supply, with a one-period information lag among households creating the in ‡ation surprise term.
The last set of equations relate to monetary policy. The Euler equation for household choice of foreign versus home bonds creates the equation of uncovered interest parity (UIP). Under …xed exchange rates, in ‡ation at home changes the real exchange rate and this feeds into net exports and the real interest rate and so the IS curve. Under ‡oating exchange rates the real exchange rate can be substituted out of the IS curve in favour of the real interest rate. We may then identify two variants of monetary policy: one with monetary targeting and a demand for money, and one with direct setting of interest rates through a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule ('in ‡ation targeting'). There is also a regime without any monetary policy, that of 'incomes policy'which we model directly with no input from our structural models here otherwise.
Estimating the error processes
In each of the models we estimate the AR coe¢ cients ( s) of the errors in the IS, Phillips Curve and, where applicable, money supply/demand functions. As the solution itself is a function of the errors, we iterate; we get a …rst approximation of the errors by using the calibrated parameter values along with the data in the IS/PP curve equation and for the expectational variables the values given by the solution's lagged terms ignoring the errors. Once we have the shock data we run AR(1) on it, to get our …rst estimates of these s in the various models.
To work out the errors implied by the models and the data, we have used a rolling forecast programme. The programme works as follows. Our …rst estimates of the s enable it to work out the expectational variables in the model conditional on lagged endogenous and projected exogenous variables 6 Using the expectational variables the model solves for the endogenous variables for the current period and all periods in the future. The new error then is simply the di¤erence between the left hand side and right hand side of the original equation where actual data is plugged in for current and lagged endogenous variables and the expected terms are from the current rolling forecast. Then we estimate AR(1) on these new errors to get the new s, which can then be used to work out the new expectational variables. The model is then solved again to get the new endogenous variables and yet again a new set of errors. This iterative procedure is repeated until the errors and s (hence also the expectations) approximately converge.
The resulting small models
We derive the small models as discussed above; here we set out the equations that emerge and are used for the bootstrapping exercise.
Fixed Exchange Rate model:
where y t is detrended output, = , N X t = (1 Ball (1999) and Batini and Haldane (1999) . The actual parameters used were adjusted to achieve reasonable model properties and so vary across models. In particular when the New Keynesian Phillips Curve is substituted for the New Classical, there are now several (two or more) forward roots as well as at least one backward root in each model's characteristic equation; all must be stable in order for the model to have a stable solution (see Minford and Peel, 2002, chapter 2) . This requires numerical analysis: because of the complexity of the equations, it is not possible to establish this analytically in any of these cases. We therefore calibrated each model so that it satis…ed this stability condition when subjected to simulation analysis. In general we found this meant keeping the value , the forward-looking term in output in the IS curve, somewhat below 1; we have varied it from 1 according to the demands of stability and this in turn required a higher to achieve and adequate long-run e¤ect of real interest rates on aggregate demand. The …rst value shown is that used for the high stickiness version. the second for the medium and low stickiness versions. + These values are those used for the high stickiness cases; for medium stickiness the value was 0.5, for low stickiness 0.9 in all regimes. The value for , the forward-looking root in the Phillips Curve, is hotly disputed in recent empirical work. Thus Rudd and Whelan (2005) , found the backward element predominant in …tting the in ‡ation data at the single equation level and so set close to zero. Gali et al. (2005) on the other hand argue on the basis of their own instrumental variable estimation procedure that it should be close to unity. We decided therefore to look at a range of values for .
The following two tables show the time-series parameters and variances used in bootstrapping the errors; they are the errors implied by the models and the data, and are found as explained in the section above on estimating the error processes.
The residual on interest rate setting in the in ‡ation targeting policy was not bootstrapped, thus being treated as an exogenous process that would have been identical across all models and shocksperhaps related to other exogenous events such as oil price movements -and not treated as stochastic policy shocks that could have followed a di¤erent pattern. The latter would suggest an arbitrariness of policy choice which may be implausible. In this it di¤ers for example from money supply growth, where developments beyond o¢ cial control will disturb money outcomes. 
Bootstrapping and the method of indirect inference
We now replicate the stochastic environment for each model-regime combination to see whether within it our estimated ARM A equations could have been generated. This we do via bootstrapping the models above with their error processes. The method can also be used to evaluate the …t of a given model; in e¤ect this arrests the method before estimation proceeds further. This is relevant as here, when we are interested in the behaviour of structural models whose structure is rather precisely speci…ed by theory. The idea of this evaluation is to create pseudo data samples -here 1000 -for in ‡ation. Within each regime we draw the vectors of i:i:d: shocks in our error processes with replacement (so preserving any cross-correlations between the shocks); we then input them into their error processes and these in turn into the model to solve for the implied path of in ‡ation over the sample period. We then run ARM A regressions (with constants and seasonals suppressed since the shocks have zero mean and no seasonality) on all the pseudo-samples to derive the implied 95% con…dence intervals for all the coe¢ cient values found. Finally we compare the ARM A coe¢ cients estimated from the actual data to see whether they lie within these 95% con…dence intervals: under the null hypothesis of the model-regime being considered, these values represent the sampling variation for the ARM A coe¢ cients. We also show a portmanteau Wald statistic, the 95% con…dence limit for the joint distribution of the ARMA parameters - Table 9 summarises the results of this exercise. This bootstrap distribution of the ARMA parameters, hence of persistence, is independent of the bootstrap variance of in ‡ation; thus we do not concern ourselves with the extent to which the structural model replicates the variance of the in ‡ation data, as our interest here is solely with persistence.
The Wald statistic is derived from the bootstrap distribution of the ARMA parameters under the null hypothesis that the structural model holds. Thus the …gures below show, for two parameters in the auxiliary equation such as in an ARMA(1,1), the bootstrap distribution of the parameters under the null, for two examples, one where the two parameter estimates are uncorrelated, the other where they are highly correlated (0.9). One can think of estimation via indirect inference as changing the parameters of the structural model, thus changing the implied distribution, so as to push the observed data point as far into the centre of the distribution as possible. The test however takes the structural parameters (and hence the bivariate distribution) as given and merely notes the position of the observed data point (here given as 0.1 and 0.9) in the distribution. The Wald statistic is computed as this position expressed as a percentile; thus a percentage for example of 96 indicates that the observed parameter estimates lie on the 96% 'contour', i.e. in the 95% rejection region.
Results for the New Classical models:
It can be seen from Table 9 that the model is accepted as a whole (based on the Wald statistic) for all regimes except for exchange rate targeting where the model falls well short of the estimated persistence. We include the incomes policy regime here for information, though it is una¤ected by the di¤erent degrees of rigidity and therefore does not …gure in the later comparisons between models.
The charts that follow show the impulse response functions with their 95% con…dence intervals. In ‡ation persistence is fairly low under Bretton Woods; rises as it moves to a ‡oating regime with incomes policy and then falls back sharply under monetary targeting -this was the period of the Thatcher government's 'monetarist' policies designed to squeeze high double-digit in ‡ation out of the economy. Finally persistence rose again under exchange rate targeting until in ‡ation targeting pushed it back down to the Bretton Woods level. 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 under exchange rate targeting but otherwise captures the shifts from low to high persistence and then back again to low. As we have seen, this is not because the persistence of the exogenous shocks changes across regimes but rather because the regimes themselves alter the response of in ‡ation to this persistence.
Results for the New Keynesian models:
We now turn to the New Keynesian versions of the model. In the following tables we show the equivalent bootstrap results. We group them into three: high in ‡ation stickiness (low-), medium, and low in ‡ation stickiness (high-):
High stickiness (low-:)
These results indicate that the high-stickiness New Keynesian version of the model is rejected for all four regimes. As we saw earlier the NC version was only rejected for Exchange Rate Targeting. The reason seems to be the high level of persistence in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve itself, which is both forward-looking as in Calvo and also has a large backward-looking component. This Phillips Curve was constructed to generate persistence: persistence is as it were 'engineered into'the in ‡ation process through it. However, the consequent di¢ culty is that though policy regime changes do have some e¤ect on the degree of persistence, this e¤ect is insu¢ cient to account for the data at least with the calibrations usually used for policy and assumed here. In ‡ation targeting brings it down materially compared with the other regimes; but still nowhere near enough. By contrast, the New Classical model derives its in ‡ation persistence properties from the autoregressive roots driving the errors as well as the monetary regime to which it is highly sensitive. We can summarise the di¤erence as that persistence in the New Keynesian model is set by the autoregressive roots essentially produced by the Phillips Curve's persistence, which can with di¢ culty be changed by the monetary regime whereas persistence in the New Classical model is set by the combination of largely …xed autoregressive roots coming from the exogenous processes and of a moving average process much a¤ected by the monetary policy regime.
Medium stickiness ( : is 0.5)
When the size of the backward-looking root is brought down to around 0.5, the model's implications are for substantially less persistence. This allows it to match the Exchange Rate Targeting regime well. But although it gets closer to the persistence of the Monetary Targeting regime, it is still rejected and is massively rejected for both Bretton Woods and In ‡ation Targeting.
Low stickiness ( :=0.9)
In this …nal version of the New Keynesian model the Phillips Curve is virtually entirely forward-looking, with the least in ‡ation stickiness of any of these Calvo contract models. The model now matches the Money Targeting and In ‡ation Targeting regimes but it is still too persistent for Bretton Woods and it is now not persistent enough for the Exchange Rate Targeting regime. 
Comparing the models
The New Keynesian model in its most sticky form generates far too much persistence in all regimes. As the backward-looking root is brought down, it is able to encompass up to two of the regimes only. The persistence features in each case are a¤ected by both the Phillips Curve and the regime itself. The …gures below illustrate this for the deterministic IRFs of a supply shock (to the Phillips curve) with an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0.6. It can be seen for example that under …xed rates for example the high-stickiness case yields extreme persistence but that under strict in ‡ation targeting with a doubled Taylor Rule coe¢ cient on in ‡ation (ITx2) persistence is greatly reduced. With the New Classical model where the Phillips Curve itself has merely a one-period information lag, the persistence properties come from the natural autoregressiveness of the errors interacting with the regime. As the regime varies the basic autoregressiveness due to the errors is modi…ed by the regime's responses; this enables the model to encompass most of the variation in persistence across regimes. Again the …gures below show how peristence is reduced as one moves from …xed rates to ITx2.
If we ask which model version is the most likely, we can measure this by an overall likelihood. In each regime the likelihood of observing the data-generated ARMA parameters, under the null of each model, can be computed from the model's probability density function (we assume this is multi-variate normal by appealling to the central limit theorem since these parameters are sample means). The natural logs of these pdfs are shown in Table 13 together with the sum across all regimes for each model. This last …gure represents the log of the joint likelihood.
The Table shows that for all the regimes other than for exchange rate targeting the model with least stickiness, the New Classical, is the most likely. This model is also the most likely overall. The various New Keynesian models perform poorly: the medium stickiness New Keynesian model is the next most likely but it is rejected in three out of the four regimes. We also look at several robustness tests (Annex C for full details). First, we examined the possibility that the monetary regime in ‡ation behaviour was better captured by an AR(2) than the ARMA(1,1) we assumed; though the last …ts better the other is close and yields a much higher estimate of persistence. Second, we looked at the case where the interest elasticity of the demand for money was much higher (ten times) than we assumed as is sometimes found. In both these cases the superiority of the New Classical model was enhanced.
Third we looked at the alternative break dates estimated with the Qu-Perron test. In this case we found a change in the ranking (see next table): the low stickiness version of the New Keynesian model did marginally better with these breaks than the New Classical. Both these models with slight in ‡ation stickiness still dominate the other much more sticky New Keynesian models which are both rejected in three out of four regimes. Boero et al. (2008) . While the resulting estimates of persistence di¤ered in detail from ours, it remained the case that the same two models with low stickiness dominated, again with our original breaks marginally favouring the New Classical and the Qu-Perron breaks marginally favouring the low-stickiness New Keynesian.
Thus our basic …nding that models with low stickiness account for the data the best by a large margin remains robust.
Conclusions
UK in ‡ation persistence varies strikingly across the many monetary regimes pursued in the UK during the postwar period. It started low under Bretton Woods, then rose sharply during the next decade as the exchange rate ‡oated without a monetary anchor, fell to virtually nil under the succeeding monetarist regime of the 1980s, before rising again to a high level when the pound was tied to the Deutschemark; …nally on the introduction of in ‡ation targeting from 1992 in ‡ation persistence dropped back again to the level last seen under Bretton Woods. These facts cannot be accounted for easily by models of nominal rigidity of the sort modelled in Calvo contracts with a medium to large element of lagged indexation. These models build a large degree of persistence into the Phillips Curve and this degree of persistence is not su¢ ciently sensitive to variations in the monetary regime to match the variation of persistence revealed in the facts. By contrast a model with minimal rigidity, such as the ‡exprice model with a one-quarter information lag, 'New Classical'in nature, or the New Keynesian with low stickiness (a very low lagged coe¢ cient) have generally better success in picking up these variations. These models rely for in ‡ation persistence more on the autoregressiveness of the error processes themselves, with di¤erent monetary regimes moderating this natural persistence more or less. We conclude in short that in ‡ation persistence is not a constant resulting from the inherent nominal stickiness of the monetary transmission process, but is rather the product of monetary policy interacting with the natural autoregressiveness of exogenous processes and is best captured by models with little nominal stickiness. Of course this leaves various possible future lines of research open. One is whether there is some mechanism that could suitably alter the parameters of the models as monetary regimes change, especially the exogenously imposed degree of stickiness in the New Keynesian models (Gertler and Leahy, 2008 , for example make pricing depend on the productivity state). Another is whether these models can also successfully address other macroeconomic regularities. We hope merely to have established in a Popperian way a negative …nding: namely that the facts of UK in ‡ation persistence strongly reject widely-used models with a substantial (…xed) degree of in ‡ation stickiness.
Annex A A final robustness test
In the period since we wrote this paper we developed improvements in our methods for testing under Indirect Inference. Thus we wished to establish whether our results would be robust to implementing these, as well as some other more minor changes in method.
The changes concerned were as follows: 1) in estimating the structural errors in each model we used the model to generate the expectations wherever these entered. This method is an iterative one since the expectations depend importantly on the autoregressive coefficients of the errors, while these coefficients in turn depend on the errors that are generated. We decided that a superior method was to use the robust estimation procedure suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982) in which the expectations are generated by instrumental variable regressions; as instruments we used the lagged values of the data, so that we used a VAR(1) of output, inflation and interest rates to generate the estimated expectations used in estimating the structural errors.
2) in bootstrapping the shocks we chose a random set of shocks for the current and next five quarters for each period; for the following period, the resulting lagged values from this simulation were used in conjunction with another drawing of six current and future shocks; and so on until the whole bootstrap of overlapping shocks was completed. Thus agents are obtaining in each period new information about the shocks, not merely for the current quarter but also for succeeding quarters. This is how many forecasts are constructed, with an interpretation each quarter of the whole pattern of current and future shocks. A simpler alternative which we now normally use is to shock only the current quarter.
3) we check explicitly for any roots on or outside the unit circle in the AR or MA coefficients of the bootstrap regressions; any bootstrap regressions where the roots are not inside the unit circle are discarded from the bootstrap distribution as providing no information 1 . When we implement these changes we find that out of the New Classical and the low-persistence New Keynesian that were the dominant models in our previous results, only the New Classical survives as a credible explanation of inflation persistence, even though it still fails to replicate the behaviour of the Exchange Rate targeting regime. The New Keynesian models generate excessive persistence in all regimes whatever their degree of stickiness. The Impulse Response Functions and their 95% bounds are shown below for all models/ regimes; they show clearly how the NK regimes all overpredict persistence. Thus our conclusion remains that inflation persistence depends essentially on the monetary regime and the persistence of exogenous shocks, rather than on some inherent persistence produced by stickiness in the Phillips Curve. 1 We ended up with the following number of bootstraps for each regime: NC NK High NK Medium NK Low  FUS  727  885  595  469  MT  1000  969  918  800  FGR  1000  511  766  641  SIT  929  983  941  717 The alternative to excluding the ARMAs from these bootstraps would have been to use constrained Maximum Likelihood estimation throughout, constraining the roots to be inside the unit circle. However that lay beyond our scope here. 
